The paper examines Johann Georg Hamann’s influence on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. Wittgenstein’s letters, diaries and Drury’s memoirs show that Wittgenstein read Hamann’s writings in the early 1930s and 1950s. Wittgenstein’s diary notes and the Cambridge lectures show that Wittgenstein’s discussion of Hamann’s views in 1931 corresponds to adopting a Hamannian view of symbols and rule-following. The view of language as an intertwining of signs, objects and meanings in use forms a common core in the philosophies of Hamann and Wittgenstein. (...) The harmony of language and reality takes place in communicative use, so non-communicative private languages and pre-linguistic ideal forms of representation are not possible. Language is a free response to reality, and it involves belief-systems and trust. (shrink)

This book develops a grammatical method for our underlying presuppositions which can help us unravel the problem of evil. The problem essentially rests on a dualism between fact and meaning. 'Evil and Intelligibility' provides an examination of the grammar of being and of the intelligibility of the world, culminating in a philosophical grammar in which God, meaning, and evil can coexist.

The article reviews different antitheodicies in response to Toby Betenson’s article “Anti-Theodicy”. Antitheodicies involve rejecting the position that God or meaning exist only, if evils have justifying morally sufficient reasons. The article builds on Betenson’s division into moral and conceptual antitheodicies and his characterization of antitheodicies as a metacritique of the problem of evil. Moral antitheodicies are problematic, as they do not address the key conceptual issues and might end up in question-begging or moralism. Dissolving the problem of evil requires (...) a conceptual antitheodicy that exposes its presuppositions as speculative metaphysics. Religious conceptual antitheodicies help to focus on different ways of sense-making that do not fall into theodicism. (shrink)

In his Peirce and Religion, Roger Ward offers an insightful interpretative angle into Peirce’s philosophy. Ward interprets Peirce as a fundamentally religious Christian and Trinitarian thinker who holds that science and religion are complementary approaches to inquiry. He tracks the development of Peirce’s pragmatism against the background of Peirce’s life, and searches for points of contact between Peirce’s pragmatism on the one hand and Trinitarian theology and Christian ecclesiology on the other. Such an interpretation would place Peirce along great Christian (...) philosophers of language like Augustine, Duns Scotus, and J. G. Hamann.Ward first gives us an overview of Peirce’s intellectual background in mid-19th... (shrink)

The logic of worldviews provides a consistent method of comparison between multiple worldviews. The present paper connects the logic of worldviews to important historical and contemporary influences. Beginning with its roots in semiotics, an account of epistemology emerges which is mediated by a belief system. We show that Charles Peirce’s pragmatistic theory of inquiry is the bedrock beneath the logic of worldviews. We formulate it as a generalized version of inquiry with underlying game-theoretic semantics. In this paper, we extend Peirce’s (...) triadic model of signs to cover knowledge mediated by systems of beliefs. Michael Polanyi’s account of personal commitment includes a subsidiary/focal distinction that views theoretical frameworks as tools for interpreting orders of reality through actual practices of research. We also see how a precedent is set by Johan Georg Hamann’s epistemology of belief, recovered by Ludwig Wittgenstein, using reason as an interpretation of God’s speech in nature. We argue that Thomas Kuhn’s theory of inquiry and worldviews (or paradigms) may be fruitfully contrasted with Peirce’s theory, with reasoning by abduction, deduction, and induction occurring within the community of inquirers. The upshot is that although worldviews may be adopted for non-rational reasons, one can meaningfully compare worldviews through a method proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre: the proponent of a theory learns the language of competing theories and uses them as a metatheory to show how one’s own theory may not have the resources to resolve certain problematic situations. Our result is a meta-linguistic falsification in the sense of Peirce’s semiotics and pragmaticism: the competing theory may be used to show that the object theory does not have a strategy at its disposal to interpret the anomalous phenomenon. (shrink)

Erkenne dich selbst sei die schwierigste Zumutung, die einem Menschen gemacht worden ist – so proklamierte Finnischer Philosoph und Hegelianer J.V. Snellman (1806–81) in der Ein-leitung zum seinen ersten philosophischen Hauptwerk. In diesem Werk ("Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit", Tübingen 1841) kommentierte Snellman sowohl G.W.F. Hegels (1770–1831) Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes als auch die Diskussion unter deutschen Hegelianern. Laut Snellman setzt die Durchführung der Idee der Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes eine engere Verbindung zwischen spekulativer (...) Logik und Geistesphilosophie vor. Im Vortrag stelle ich die Frage, was für eine Verbindung Snellman tatsächlich im Auge hatte. (shrink)

Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881) tunnetaan valtiomiehenä, sanomalehtimiehenä ja kansallisena herättäjänä, mutta hänen filosofiansa on usein jäänyt hänen yhteiskunnallisen vaikutuksensa varjoon. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" piirtää yleiskuvan Snellmanin ja hänen esikuvansa G. W. F. Hegelin (1770–1831) filosofiasta. Se toimii johdantoteoksena heidän ajatteluunsa ja kertoo samalla 1800-luvun Suomen henkisen elämän kansainvälisyydestä. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" selittää, miten Snellman Hegelin ajattelua käytti ja tulkitsi, ja korostaa, millaisissa asioissa Snellman teki pesäeron sekä Hegeliin että maineikkaisiin hegeliläisiin kuten Ludwig Feuerbachiin ja David Friedrich Straussiin. "Maailmanhenki Pohjolassa" (...) on perusteos suomalaisesta filosofiasta ja Suomen kulttuurihistoriasta kiinnostuneille. (shrink)

The study discusses the philosophy of Finnish philosopher J.V. Snellman (1806–81). The focus is on Snellman's so-called philosophy of personality, which he presented in his work "Essay on the speculative Development of the Idea of Personality" (Tübingen, 1841). Besides this work he addressed his philosophy of personality in his other works and in his public lectures. -/- In his philosophy of personality Snellman develops the concept of personality within the framework of G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy. The concept (...) of personality serves as a basis for Hegel's philosophy of right, and it plays an important role also in other parts of Hegel's system. However, he never provided a comprehensive definition of this concept. The essence of personality was debated among Hegelians after Hegel's death in 1831. In the course of the debate the Hegelian school split into two groups. At the time of publication of "The Idea of Personality" there was a serious rift between the Right- and the Left-Hegelians. -/- The study analyzes Snellman's philosophy of personality in respect of Hegel's philosophy and in respect of the views of other Hegelians – mainly D.F. Strauss (1808–74), L. Feuerbach (1804–72) and C.F. Göschel (1781–1861). I also attend to some contemporaries outside the Hegelian School like F.W.J. Schelling (1775–1854) and I.H. Fichte (1796–1879). -/- The study is divided into six sections (A–F). The first comprises an introduction and an outline of the structure of the study. The second section (B) discusses the historical context of Snellman's philosophy. The first subsection focuses on the Central European debate on Hegel's legacy. The second subsection deals with Snellman's life and his work on philosophy. The systematic part of the study comprises three sections (C–E), which consider the dialectic of Snellman's work of 1841. This dialectic follows the outline of Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit and culminates in the definition of personality. Snellman, however, exceeds the realm of the philosophy of subjective spirit, as he discusses e.g. the philosophy of religion. He also comments on the debate among Hegelians. According to Snellman, neither Right- nor Left-Hegelians are true to Hegel's philosophy. In effect, his own standpoint in the debate, as I will argue, comes close to that of the Left-Hegelians. The study concludes with a summary (F). (shrink)

The paper discusses J.V. Snellman's (1806–81) reading of F.W.J. Schelling's (1775–1854) philosophy. The reading was presented in his book "Essay on the speculative Development of the Idea of Personality" (1841). Snellman, the most remarkable Finnish Hegelian, focused on Schelling's text "Philosophical investigations into the essence of human freedom" (1809). In Snellman's view Schelling is a forerunner to Hegel. He was not familiar with the details of Schelling's later critic towards Hegel. -/- Snellman became interested in Schelling, (...) because the latter highlights the importance of personality. The essence of evil is further linked with the essence of personality. One asks, for example, that if human personality is seen as dependent on the personality of God, is it reasonable to say that human person is responsible for evil acts? Snellman's main concern is to argue against the positivity of evil. He agrees with Schelling that evil exists only as evil action. (shrink)

Der Beitrag, dessen Schwerpunkt auf metaphysischen Fragestellungen liegt, expliziert das Verhältnis zwischen Kants und Hegels Auffassungen der Person. Der Begriff der Person spielt eine wichtige Rolle in praktischer Philosophie Kants. Kant verneint dagegen die Auffassung der ontologischen Person. Nachkantischer deutscher Idealismus kann als Wiederherstellung der Personontologie erörtert werden. Persönliches Sein prägt auch Philosophie Hegels. Hegel thematisiert Person aber systematisch nur im Bereich der Philosophie des Rechts. Der Standpunkt des finnischen Hegelianers J.V. Snellman (1806–81) wird als Fortsetzung der Philosophie Hegels (...) betrachtet. Besonders sein Werk "Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit" (1841) steht im Brennpunkt des Beitrags. (shrink)

Artikkeli käsittelee J. V. Snellmanin (1806–81) varhaisvaiheen filosofiaa ja sen suhdetta hänen 1840-luvun alun filosofiseen pääteokseensa "Persoonallisuuden idean spekulatiivisen kehittelyn yritys" (Versuch einer speculativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit). Varhaisvaiheen filosofia viittaa Snellmanin julkaistuihin kirjoituksiin vuosina 1835–40 sekä luentokäsikirjoituksiin ja muihin muistiinpanoihin. -/- Artikkelin keskiössä on Snellmanin varhainen luenta G. W. F. Hegelin (1770–1831) filosofiasta. Snellmanin filosofian on yleensä katsottu seuraavan Hegelin esikuvaa uskollisesti. Tämä pitää pääasiassa paikkansa, mutta toisaalta Snellman ei missään vaiheessa uraansa epäröinyt poiketa Hegelin viitoittamalta tieltä. (...) Hän ei tosin juuri korostanut eroja itsensä ja saksalaisen esikuvansa välillä. Snellman esitti varhaisfilosofiassaan muun muassa omaperäisen tulkinnan Hegelin subjektiivisen hengen filosofiasta. Hän pyrki myös yhdistämään Hegelin kaksi logiikan pääesitystä yhdeksi kokonaisuudeksi. Snellman myös täydensi joiltain osin Hegelin systeemiä. Hegel ei esimerkiksi koskaan vastannut yksiselitteisesti kysymykseen siitä, tarvitseeko hänen systeeminsä itsenäisen johdannon. Snellman katsoi johdannon tarpeelliseksi ja esitti varhaisfilosofiassaan oman versionsa johdannosta. Snellmanin johdanto keskittyi itsetietoisuuden käsitteeseen, joka oli keskeisessä roolissa myös hänen vuonna 1841 julkaisemassaan teoksessa "Persoonallisuuden idean spekulatiivisen kehittelyn yritys". (shrink)

Tämä artikkeli käsittelee J. V. Snellmanin sijoittumista hegeliläisen filosofian kentälle. Hegeliläinen koulukunta jakautui 1830-luvun kuluessa oikeisto-, vasemmisto- ja keskustahegeliläisyyteen. J. V. Snellmanin filosofian tutkimuksessa on usein nostettu esiin Carl Ludwig Michelet’n (1843, 314) luonnehdinta Snellmanista vasemman keskustan hegeliläisenä. Michelet’n käsitys on edeltävässä tutkimuksessa yleisesti hyväksytty. Sitä, mikä tekee Snellmanista nimenomaan vasemman keskustan eikä esimerkiksi oikean keskustan edustajaa ei kuitenkaan juuri ole pohdittu. Esitän seuraavassa muutamia huomioita, joiden myötä kuva Snellmanin sijoittumisesta hegeliläisten kentässä tarkentuu.

Although personal being plays an important role in G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy he never provided a comprehensive definition of personality. Within the framework of his works it is thus possible to formulate different definitions of person and personality, and several conflicting definitions were presented among Hegelians during the 1830s and 1840s. In this paper I examine the role of personality in Hegel's system and discuss the relationship between personality and metaphysics. The question shall be analyzed in the context of various (...) works by Hegel and contrasted with two important precursors of Hegel, I. Kant (1724–1804) and J.G. Fichte (1762–1814). I shall also put the philosophy of Finnish Hegelian J.V. Snellman (1806–81) under scrutiny. The paper will indicate the importance of logic for Hegelian metaphysics and for Hegelian conception of personality. (shrink)

Embora ser pessoal desempenhe um papel importante na filosofia de G.W.F. Hegel, ele nunca forneceu uma definição compreensiva de personalidade. Dentro do arcabouço de seus trabalhos, é, então, possível formular diferentes definições de pessoa e personalidade e algumas definições conflitantes foram apresentadas entre hegelianos durante as décadas de 1830 e 1840. Nesse artigo, examino o papel da personalidade no sistema de Hegel e discuto a relação entre personalidade e metafísica. A questão deve ser analisada no contexto dos vários trabalhos de (...) Hegel e contrastada com dois precursores importantes de Hegel, I. Kant e J.G. Fichte. Tentarei também por a filosofia do hegeliano finlandês J.V. Snellman sob escrutínio. O artigo também indica a importância da lógica à metafísica hegeliana e a sua concepção de personalidade. (shrink)

Itsenäisen Suomen filosofian historia tunnetaan sen läheisistä suhteista anglosaksiseen akateemiseen maailmaan. Autonomian aikana suomalainen akateeminen filosofia suuntautui sitä vastoin saksankieliseen Eurooppaan. Esittelen tässä tekstissä joitain esimerkkejä saksalaisen filosofian vaikutuksesta suomalaiseen filosofiaan autonomian aikana.

Some philosophers of religion have argued that moral anti-theodicy begs the question. This paper evaluates the arguments from two such philosophers, writing a decade apart—Robert Mark Simpson, and Lauri Snellman. Simpson argues that any global argument against theodicy must allow for the possibility of there existing a plausible theodicy, and that anti-theodical arguments (the argument from insensitivity, the argument from detachment, and the argument from harmful consequences) all implicitly discount this possibility, thus ending up begging the question. (...) class='Hi'>Snellman argues that moral anti-theodicies presuppose that some evils cannot be justified, which would presuppose that theodicy is false from the start, which in turn would beg the question against theodicy. The author of the paper argues that Simpson’s arguments rest on an erroneous assumption regarding the nature of anti-theodicy, and that one of Simpson’s arguments sets a problematic standard for argumentation that the author argues we should not accept. It is also argued that Snellman’s argument relies on an unsupported claim from Toby Betenson. Therefore, the author concludes that Simpson and Snellman have not managed to show that moral anti-theodicies beg the question. (shrink)

The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the three most influential linguistic traditions - Greek, Latin, and Arabic - and offers insightful interpretations of historical theories of perception, dreaming, and thinking. This first volume focuses on sense perception and discusses philosophical questions concerning the external senses, their classification, and their functioning, from Aristotle (...) to Brentano. (shrink)

In Perception and the Internal Senses Juhana Toivanen offers a philosophical reconstruction of Peter of John Olivi’s (ca. 1248-98) conception of the cognitive psychology of the sensitive or animal soul.

The aim of this literature study was to suggest a value ground for nursing anchored in two ethical principles: the principle of human value and the right to experience a meaningful life. Previous nursing research between the years 2000 and 2009 was analysed. Presented values suggested in this value ground are thus in line with the nursing context and science of today. Statements within ethical literature have been used in order to formulate arguments aimed at supporting the values that were (...) found in the study. In the literature study six values were found: trust, nearness, sympathy, support, knowledge and responsibility. These values hold equal status and are not presented in hierarchical order. They vary due to the persons involved, nursing situations and cultural surroundings, but have the common requirement of being non-excluding. In order to implement the values within the value ground, two prerequisites are discussed and claimed as essential: ethical dialogue and a caring encounter between care provider and patients. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of the thought experiment changed radically in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The earlier authors—Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Peter of Spain, and John of la Rochelle—understood it as an ontological proof for the existence and/or the nature of the soul. By contrast, Matthew of Aquasparta and Vital du Four used the flying (...) man as an argument for the soul’s ability to be directly aware of itself. A detailed analysis of the views of these authors shows interesting philosophical differences between them and reveals how one of the crucial premises of the original thought experiment—namely that the flying man is unaware of his body—loses its importance due to the changes in the argumentative role that is assigned to it. The most radical example of a new way of understanding bodily self-awareness is Peter Olivi’s so-called ‘man before the creation.’. (shrink)

This article discusses the theories of perception of Robert Kilwardby and Peter of John Olivi. Our aim is to show how in challenging certain assumptions of medieval Aristotelian theories of perception they drew on Augustine and argued for the active nature of the soul in sense perception. For both Kilwardby and Olivi, the soul is not passive with respect to perceived objects; rather, it causes its own cognitive acts with respect to external objects and thus allows the subject to perceive (...) them. We also show that Kilwardby and Olivi differ substantially regarding where the activity of the soul is directed to and the role of the sensible species in the process, and we demonstrate that there are similarities between their ideas of intentionality and the attention of the soul towards the corporeal world. (shrink)

In The Political Animal in Medieval Philosophy Juhana Toivanen investigates what medieval philosophers meant when they argued that human beings are political animals by nature. He analyses the notion of ‘political animal’ from various perspectives and shows its relevance to philosophical discussions concerning the foundations of human sociability, ethics, and politics. -/- Medieval authors thought that social life stems from the biological and rational nature of human beings, and that collaboration with other people promotes prosperity and good life. Toivanen (...) provides a detailed philosophical interpretation of this view across wide range of authors, including unedited manuscript sources. As the first monograph length study on the topic, The Political Animal sheds new light to this significant period in western political thought. (shrink)

This introductory chapter delineates the purpose and content of the edited volume. It reflects on how the potential tension and compatibility between self-interest and the common good have been addressed in the history of philosophy, and it elaborates on the theoretical conditions that must be met in order for a real distinction between these two notions to emerge. The introduction also underscores the advantages of exploring this subject over the transitional period from medieval to early modern philosophy, and suggests ways (...) in which historical views may be useful for contemporary discussions. The chapter concludes by outlining the structure of the book and summarizing the arguments presented in individual chapters. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 54, Issue 1, pp 22 - 45 This essay discusses the views of Peter Olivi on the foundations of political power and agency. The central argument is that there is a strong connection between Olivi’s voluntarist psychology and his views concerning political power. According to Olivi, political power is ultimately based on the will of God, but in such a way that both the rulers and their subjects have, through their individual freedom, the liberty to use their (...) share of power as they will. In fact, Olivi conceptualises political power as an extension of the dominion that human beings have over their wills, which is essential for being a political agent in the full sense. By providing a philosophical analysis of the role of the freedom of the will within Olivi’s political philosophy, this essay sheds light on his conception of the relation between the human and the divine will, as well as on his understanding of political power. (shrink)

This article traces the philosophical idea of self-perception from the times of ancient Stoicism to the thirteenth century by analyzing the views of Seneca, Augustine, and Olivi. The central argument is that they defend the same idea according to which self-preservation and the appropriate use of one’s body requires awareness thereof, despite the obvious contextual differences and the uncertainty of direct historical connections between the authors. They think that this kind of self-awareness does not belong only to human beings, because (...) irrational animals need to perceive their bodies, the functions of their bodily parts, and to perceive themselves as living beings in order to act appropriately and survive. The attribution of self-perception to animals is based on a distinction between the experiential awareness of the soul and the intellectual understanding of its essence, a distinction postulated by all three authors. The philosophical affinities between their views show that ideas that originate in Stoic thought were transmitted, directly or indirectly, to medieval philosophical psychology. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss my experiences of being an insider researching Laestadianism. I present my research, noting the advantages and disadvantages, ending with a conclusion in which I refer to the discussion among anthropologists and ethnologists, especially in the study of religion. The outcome is that even though the distinction insider–outsider researcher is complicated, both insider and outsider researchers will improve the research, contributing to its nuanced presentation.

1. 1826-1840 -- 2. 1840-1842 -- 3. 1842-1843 -- 4. 1844-1845 -- 5. 1845-1847 -- 6. 1847-1849 -- 7. 1850-1856 -- 8. 1857-1858 -- 9. 1859-1860.

The present article delves into the history of political philosophy by discussing human sociability in Antonio Montecatini's (1537–99) commentary on Aristotle's Politics. The focus is on a philosophical analysis of three interrelated ideas that Montecatini discusses: (1) Aristotle's dictum that human beings are political animals by nature; (2) naturalness of the household; and (3) the nature and origin of political communities. Montecatini's views are briefly related to those of John Case (ca. 1546–1600), and they are also contextualized within the late (...) medieval commentary tradition on the Politics, but the main aim is to clarify Montecatini's philosophical position and examine the ways in which he deviates from Aristotelian naturalism in political philosophy. This paves the way to a deeper understanding of the developments that led to early modern innovations. (shrink)

This essay contributes to contemporary discussions concerning so‐called animal politics by drawing from the history of the notion of political animal. Two different historical meanings of the notion are identified: (1) normative political animality that is intrinsically linked with rationality, language, and justice; (2) biological political animality that focuses on collaboration for the sake of a common aim. The former is applicable only to human beings, while the latter can also be used in relation to other animals. After briefly discussing (...) the Aristotelian background of the notion, the essay argues that in medieval Aristotelian tradition, the normative meaning prevailed and the biological one was set aside. However, it is precisely the biological notion that appears useful today. The essay suggests several ways in which it might benefit contemporary theoretical discussions concerning animals, thus laying ground for further developments in animal politics. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the reception of Avicenna’s well-known “flying man” thought experiment in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin philosophy. The central claim is that the argumentative role of the thought experiment changed radically in the latter half of the thirteenth century. The earlier authors—Dominicus Gundissalinus, William of Auvergne, Peter of Spain, and John of la Rochelle—understood it as an ontological proof for the existence and/or the nature of the soul. By contrast, Matthew of Aquasparta and Vital du Four used the flying (...) man as an argument for the soul’s ability to be directly aware of itself. A detailed analysis of the views of these authors shows interesting philosophical differences between them and reveals how one of the crucial premises of the original thought experiment—namely that the flying man is unaware of his body—loses its importance due to the changes in the argumentative role that is assigned to it. The most radical example of a new way of understanding bodily self-awareness is Peter Olivi’s so-called ‘man before the creation.’. (shrink)

This chapter analyses how one thirteenth century Parisian philosopher, Nicholas of Vaudémont (fl. 1370s), understood the tension between the common good in the sense of the good of the community as a whole, and individual good in his commentary of Aristotle’s Politics. The analysis proceeds in relation to two of Nicholas’ questions. The first of them concerns the classical problem of whether or not a virtuous person should sacrifice his life for the sake of his community; and the second question (...) is related to the justification of capital punishment for the sake of the common good. It is claimed that Nicholas entertains at least a theoretical possibility that virtuous action may not necessarily entail the common good and that he further distinguishes the concern for the common good from the private sphere by arguing that responsibility of the common good rests solely with the political ruler. As a result, the tension becomes a fracture as the theoretical distance between the good of an individual and the common good widens. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on thirteenth-century Latin discussions concerning the psychological processes that explain some of the most sophisticated features of perceptual experience. Sense perception primarily conveys information about the sensible qualities of external objects; we see colours, hear sounds, taste flavours, and so forth. Yet, our experience of the external world contains several elements that cannot be reduced to these qualities. To name a few, external objects are perceived as three-dimensional bundles of properties, as useful or harmful for the perceiving (...) subject, and as objects of desires, fears, and other emotions, and they are conceptualised in various ways—in short, they are perceived as something. It is well known that medieval philosophers recognised these and other similar phenomena. They analysed various elements of perceptual experience, which are not (or cannot be) directly apprehended by the external senses. In order to account for these elements, they argued that in addition to the five external senses, several so-called internal senses contribute to perception. The leading idea in their approach was to divide complex psychological processes into sub-processes or functions that can then be attributed to various internal senses, and analysed separately. An analysis of medieval views from the perspective of the interplay between external and internal senses allows us to understand the complexity of perceptual experience. This chapter will (1) specify different types of ‘perceiving as’ that medieval authors recognised, (2) explain what kind of additions these processes make to perception, (3) suggest two heuristic models that can be used to analyse medieval theories, and (4) ask where the limit between conceptual and non-conceptual perception lies. (shrink)

Perception of the external world is an essential part of the animal (including human) life, both as a source of knowledge and as a way to survive. Medieval authors accepted this view, and despite general concerns about the reliability of the senses in the acquisition of certain and objective knowledge, they thought that for the most part our perceptual system gets things right when it comes to the perceptual features of things—but not always. Our article focuses on thirteenth- and fourteenth-century (...) philosophical discussions of illusions and other types of perceptual errors. Reception of incorrect information, misjudgments concerning perceptual objects, the binding problem, and similar cases that explain perceptual errors will be analyzed. We discuss what might be called medieval Aristotelian/Avicennian theories of perception and the internal senses (drawing mainly from Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas), as well as the so-called perspectivist accounts of perception, especially that by Alhacen. Finally, we take up a debate between Peter Auriol and his critics, which contains elements that can be seen as precursors of later skeptical worries. The concern here is that, just like in contemporary discussions leading to disjunctivism, the absence of a secure way to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical perception leads to a general worry about the reliability of our experience of the world. (shrink)

This essay discusses how medieval authors from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries dealt with a philosophical problem that social institutions pose for the Aristotelian dichotomy between natural and artificial entities. It is argued that marriage, political community, and language provided a particular challenge for the conception that things which are designed by human beings are artefacts. Medieval philosophers based their arguments for the naturalness of social institutions on the anthropological view that human beings are political animals by nature, but this (...) strategy required rethinking the borderline between nature and art. The limits of nature were extended, as social institutions were considered to be natural even though they are in many ways similar to artificial products. (shrink)

The subject matter of this essay is Peter of John Olivi’s (ca.1248–98) conception of reason from the viewpoint of human action.

The present essay examines Peter Olivi's (ca. 1248-98) theory of morally bad choices and moral vices, focusing in particular on his view of the substantiality of moral vices, moral psychology, and the role of self-love and its relation to pride.

The present article delves into the history of political philosophy by discussing human sociability in Antonio Montecatini’s (1537–99) commentary on Aristotle’s Politics. The focus is on a philosophical analysis of three interrelated ideas that Montecatini discusses: (1) Aristotle’s dictum that human beings are political animals by nature; (2) naturalness of the household; and (3) the nature and origin of political communities. Montecatini’s views are briefly related to a contemporary of his, John Case (ca. 1546–1600), and they are also contextualized within (...) the late medieval commentary tradition on the Politics, but the main aim is to clarify Montecatini’s philosophical position and examine the ways in which he deviates from Aristotelian naturalism in political philosophy. This paves the way to a deeper understanding of the developments that led to early modern innovations. (shrink)

Peter of John Olivi’s Tractatus de contractibus is nowadays regarded as an important document in the history of economic thought.1 Modern scholars have proposed various interpretations of its exact contribution. Many aspects of Olivi’s argumentation have been traced to earlier discussions concerning the Roman and Canon laws, as well as to theological and philosophical literature on economic questions, but his overall approach has also been credited for transforming the medieval framework in a profound way.2 His definition of capital, recognition of (...) “probable profit”, qualified acceptance of receiving interest for loans, and his keen eye for understanding actual economic practices have been discussed in... (shrink)

This article consists of critical editions of a selection of medieval commentaries on the chapter seven of Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato, which pertains to a particular philosophical problem, namely, the possibility of perceiving many perceptual qualities simultaneously. The commentaries included are written by Adam of Buckfield, Anonymous of Merton, Radulphus Brito, Anonymous of Paris, John Felmingham(?), Walter Burley, John of Jandun, and John Buridan. The most significant discovery made in the course of preparing the editions concerns Walter Burley’s commentary. (...) Previous studies indicate that he wrote only an exposition commentary on De sensu, but a more careful examination of the existing manuscripts shows that at least one of them contains a different work, here dubbed Quaestiones super librum De sensu et sensato. (shrink)

Hobbes spent most of his adult life in the service of the influential Cavendish family. The Historical Dictionary of Hobbes's Philosophy offers a comprehensive guide to the many facets of Hobbes's work.